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Reviewed by Laura S. Underkuffler
What is property? If we protect land, copyrights, and body parts as property,
why do we protect them? Are the reasons that we do so matters of historical
accident or considered policy?
This book tackles nothing less than these fundamental questions. In a
sweeping, panoramic view of the history and development of American
property law over the past two centuries, Professor Stuart Banner suggests
answers to these questions. Each chapter of the book, elegantly and
engrossingly written, presents the legal and political history of a different
kind of property. The narratives are chock full of fascinating and previously
unassembled details about the famous cases, political events, and personalities
that have contributed to the rough and tumble history of American property
law. In the process, Banner upends many conventional notions about the legal
history of property in the United States.
Consider, for instance, the regulation of land use. The conventional
wisdom is that the idea of comprehensive land-use controls was born with
the enactment of a zoning ordinance by New York City in 1916. In fact, landuse controls were first imposed in colonial times (183). In the colonial period,
owners were often required to improve or use their land, fence crops, drain
wetlands, and build in particular locations to enhance collective goals such
as security or the conservation of land (183). There were colonial limitations
on the height of buildings, permitted building materials, and even external
design ideas (183–184). After statehood, local governments continued these
practices. “In Boston, for example, the fronts of new buildings had to form
a straight line, while dwelling houses in one Virginia town had to exceed a
minimum size” (184). As Banner notes, “[t]his tradition of piecemeal local
land use regulation continued through the late nineteenth century and into
the early twentieth….” (184). The movement to formal zoning schemes in the
early 1900s, then, was “not from laissez-faire to regulation, but rather from
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piecemeal regulation to more comprehensive citywide regulatory schemes…”
(184). (Incidentally—and perhaps most devastating to those of us who have
taught to the contrary—the first citywide zoning ordinance was enacted not by
New York City, as is commonly believed, but by Los Angeles in 1908) (184–
185).
From another direction, the idea that zoning was fundamentally about
the preservation of the physical character of neighborhoods, with only an
occasional (darker) lapse into social and racial exclusion, is exploded by this
book. Banner writes that “[f]rom the beginning, zoning was as much about
excluding undesirable people as about excluding undesirable uses of land”
(190). A treatise on the law of zoning written in 1922 discussed the “invasion
of the inferior” (deliberately ambiguous, as to whether it referred to tenements
or their inhabitants) when discussing the dangers that zoning was intended to
prevent (190). Banner observes that “[i]n 1910, Baltimore enacted an ordinance
establishing separate zones for blacks and whites. The idea was quickly copied
in other cities, including Atlanta, Louisville, St. Louis, Oklahoma City, and
New Orleans” (190). When the United States Supreme Court declared racially
restrictive zoning unconstitutional in 1917,11 its rationale was not that black
residents were wronged, but that white owners who wished to sell to black
purchasers were denied their right to alienate their property as they saw fit
(190).22
Of course, what could not be done publicly could be done privately.
Banner discusses a study of 84 housing subdivisions throughout the country,
which was conducted in 1928. Approximately half of those subdivisions were
governed by privately placed racial restrictions, including nearly all built
after 1917 (193–194). The targets of racially restrictive covenants varied. In the
South and East, blacks were the most frequently excluded group; in the West,
it was “‘Orientals’” (194). During this era, Andrew Bruce, a law professor at
Northwestern University, opined that “[r]acial covenants were the only solution
to ‘the negro problem’…. Deprived of the ability to zone [blacks] out,…the
best alternative available to cities [in Bruce’s view] was what he called ‘racial
zoning by private contract’” (194). Perhaps most shockingly, Banner describes
how the federal government promoted racial covenants in the 1930s through
the home loan program of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). The
FHA recommended racial covenants for the properties that it insured, and
even published a model covenant for developers to copy (195).
Banner describes early court challenges to racially restrictive covenants,
and—in the process—illuminates this dark corner of American judicial and
social history. For instance, he tells how, in a little-known case, the California
Court of Appeals held a covenant that barred sale to “any person of African,
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Chinese, or Japanese dissent” to be invalid33 (195). The reason was not its
odious nature, per sé, but how the principle for which it stood might affect
the availability of housing stock for majority groups. “Such a restriction might
seem perfectly reasonable, the court explained, but if it were allowed, what
would come next? There might be bars ‘on selling or leasing to persons of
Caucasian descent, or to any but albinos from the heart of Africa or blond
Eskimos’”44 (195). Rather ugly logic, but the result in the case—invalidating
such covenants—was an advance. That advance was short-lived, however. A
few months later, the California Supreme Court held that “[r]estraints on
sale might be void,…but restraints on occupancy were not” (195). As a result,
developers needed only to express covenants as restrictions on occupancy
rather than sale in order to preserve all-white enclaves (195). It was not until
Shelley v. Kraemer,55 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1948, that racially
restrictive covenants were held invalid as a matter of national policy. By that
time, it was estimated that “56 percent of [recently constructed] homes were
off limits to African-Americans, and in the larger subdivisions, that figure was
85 percent” (195). Even today, racially restrictive covenants remain part of
recorded deeds, particularly in the South.
In other chapters, Banner discusses the development of property ideas in
more avant garde areas. For instance, the idea of “owning” radio wavelengths
has been controversial from the beginning. After the invention of the radio,
and “[n]ew broadcasters without existing licenses began crowding frequencies
already allocated to others,…[o]ne possibility was to recognize property rights
in particular wavelengths, rights that would allow existing users to stave off
trespassers” (204–205). Opponents feared that “property in wavelengths”
might eviscerate public control of a public resource, and lead to domination
of broadcasting by a few corporate entities (205–211). As a result, “[a]s a formal
matter…the Radio Act of 1927 created a system without property rights in
wavelengths. In practice, however, things were not so clear” (212). Monetary
interests shifted from “wavelengths as property” to “broadcasting stations and
their licenses as property.” “By the middle of the [20th] century, it was clear
that beneath this layer of obfuscation the radio spectrum was governed by a de
facto system of property rights. The Federal Communications Commission…
routinely granted renewals of broadcasting licenses…[and] routinely
approved the sale of stations, even when the sale price must have included
some increment that represented the value of the license” (215).
In a chapter dealing with another sort of “new property,” that of governmentgranted benefits and employment, Banner traces the ascendance of property
ideas in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of the 1960s and 1970s, only to be
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abandoned (for most practical purposes) later (229–237). Currently, the law is
rife with inconsistency: for instance, drivers’ licenses and horse-training licenses
are property, but a job as a probationary police officer is not (235). Even when
a state-created interest of this type is property, only minimal procedures are
required for its deprivation (235). (Among the tales of judicial infighting and
discord in this field, we are also told little-known facts about Charles Reich, the
author of the law review article, “The New Property,”66 that arguably started
it all. Although this article is (at last count) the fourth-most cited law review
article ever written, Reich was left a “bitterly disappointed” man (236). He
wanted more than personal fame; he wanted practical protection for welfare
recipients and others dependent upon government largesse (236).)
Another avant garde area discussed by Banner is that of “owning life” (238).
Reluctance to recognize the human body as property has led to bizarre results
in American cases, such as one from South Carolina.77 Banner describes how
“a man was murdered and his body left on the railroad tracks. Trains ran him
over three times before anyone noticed” (239). The administrator of the dead
man’s estate sued the railroad, but recovery was denied. “‘[T]o entitle one to
bring an action for an injury to any specific object or thing, he must have a
property [interest] therein,’ the court reasoned”88 (240). Recovery was allowed
for the deceased’s clothing and watch, which were likewise mutilated (240).
Our society’s abhorrence of the idea of the body as property is, of course,
highly situational. Human hair, skin, blood, sperm, eggs, and corneas have
all been held by legislatures or courts—in some cases, for many years—to be
property (241–248).
So what, in the end, do we make of all of this? Are the property interests
that this book describes matters of historical accident, or considered policy?
As a primarily historical account, this book’s answer to this question must,
necessarily, be limited. The book does not explore, for instance, whether
any reasoned account could be given of the property interests that the law
has recognized at any particular time. The book does argue, richly and
convincingly, that the idea of property is malleable, and is contingent upon
prevailing social and historical forces. Whatever abstract theories could
be advanced for particular property rules, the explanation for the legal
enforcement of those rules is undeniably a tale of political and legal power.
Before closing, Banner addresses one last question. If property is so
malleable, does it have any “true nature”? (289) He is skeptical. Although
“[p]hilosophers and law professors sometimes try to discern property’s ‘true’
nature,…the stories in this book” suggest none (289). Property is simply a
means to socially determined ends (291).
In a sense, Banner is undoubtedly right. If by property’s “true nature,” we
mean that there is an enduring idea of content or configuration of rights that
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property represents, then property largely (if not completely) fails this test. The
“true nature” of property might be seen, however, in a different way. Property
as an idea expresses the human need to control, appropriate, and protect the
external, often physical, and usually finite resources that human beings value.
Indeed, the very existence of this excellent book and the complex history it
tells is a testament to the enduring power of this concept. Property’s myriad
of changing rules, their uses and abuses, speaks not of property’s weakness
but of its insistent and irrepressible strength. As long as the human need to
appropriate and control exists, there will be claims of property, whether made
by the affluent or by the homeless. The question is not whether property, as an
idea, will reflect this truth; it is, rather, what values we—as a society—will bring
to it.

